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NoTEs AND ComroENTs
CREATION OF JOINT TENANCY BY CONVEYANCE OF
TENANTS IN COMMON TO THEMSELVES
In the recent Kentucky case of Haynes v Barker,' G conveyed to
husband and wife as tenants in common, but with the intention to create in them a joint tenancy with survivorship. To correct the error
caused by the form of the conveyance H and W simply conveyed the
real estate to themselves to be held jointly with right of survivorship.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that a joint tenancy was thereby created.
Apparently a case precisely like the instant case has never been
decided previously by any court, but there are many similar cases
where one spouse has conveyed to himself and the other spouse, or one
owner to himself and another. The principal question in all these cases
is: What type of estate was created by the conveyance?
The courts have differed considerably as to the effect of the type
of conveyance under consideration, and an analysis of the cases indicates that the principal point upon which they differ is the effect of
such conveyance upon the requisite unities of the ]omt tenancy or
2
tenancy by the entirety.
"The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity, which is
fourfold; the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time,
and the unity of possession; or, in other words, joint-tenants have one
and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance,
commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the
same undivided possession.'"
"A tenancy by the entirety
is essentially a form of joint tenancy,
modified by the common-law theory that husband and wife are one
person."'

In some cases the unities of time and title are held to be lacking,
and hence a tenancy in common results, the only unity necessary to
'239 S.W 2d 996 (Ky. 1951).
A joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety are both forms of co-ownership
in which the tenants own undivided shares in the land with right of survivorship.
The practical difference is that in the ]omt tenancy either tenant may sever the
tenancy and thereby destroy the survivorship feature; while m the tenancy by
the entirety neither tenant can sever the tenancy so as to destroy the right of
survivorsip. This is due to the fact that each joint tenant is seized per my et per
tout, vhile tenants by the entirety are seized per tout et non per my. This in turn
is due to the additional unity of the tenancy by the entirety pointed out above. A
tenancy in common is a third form of co-ownership in which the tenants own
undivided shares, but in this there is no right of survivorship.
22 BLACKSTONE S COIfmaNTARS 180 (1777).
'2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 217 (3d ed. 1939).
Prewitt v. Previtt, 397 II. 178, 73 N.E. 2d 312 (1947); Porter v. Porter,
381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E. 2d 635 (1942); Stuehin v. Mikulshi, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W
595 (1941); Price v. National Umon Fire Ins. Co., 294 Mich. 289, 293 N.W 652
(1940); Deslauners v. Senesac, 331 II. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928); Brietenback
v. Schoen, 183 Wis. 589, 198 N.W 622 (1924); Michigan State Bank of Eaton
Rapids v. Kern, 189 Mich. 467, 155 N.W 502 (1915).
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the tenancy in common being the unity of possession. The unities are
lacking, it is said, because one cannot be both grantor and grantee,
which really means, as was pointed out in the frequently cited case of
Deslaurzers v Senesac,6 that: "A person cannot convey or deliver to
himself that which he already possesses." In other words the grantor
in an attempt to make such a conveyance merely divests herself of an
undivided one-half interest, since it "is manifest from the deed that
she did not intend to convey the whole and entire interest to her husband, for she retained an equal share or interest.
" The court m this
landmark case purported to follow Green v Cannady,7 but the court
in that case actually adhered to the view laid down in Shepherd's
Touchstone: 8
'Ifa deed be made to one that is incapable, and to others that are
capable, in tbis case it shall enure only to him that is capable. And
if they were to be joint-tenants, the person who is capable shall take
the whole. But if they were to be tenants in common, he shall have
"
only ns particular share.
If the doctrine that one cannot be both grantor and grantee were
applied to the principle set out in the Green case, the Deslaurierscase
would have held that a fee simple was conveyed to the grantee husband. This would seem to be sounder reasoning in view of techmcal
historical principles. The difference in the two cases is that the court
m the Deslaurterscase refuses to allow the other grantee to take the
whole, it being "manifest
that she did not ntend to convey the
whole.
" (Writers italics) But if the court is to give partial effect
to the grantors intention (rather than istorical logic) in order to
prevent injustice, why does the court not go further and allow the intent of the grantor to prevail throughout, thereby permitting the creation of a joint tenancyP As to tis the court says:
"It was not for failure to ascertain the intention of the grantors that
the grantees did not take title m a joint tenancy, but because, under
the law, a joint tenancy could not be created in the manner which
was here attempted. The operation of a deed on the legal title is not
controlled by the intention of the parties, but is governed by law."0
In one instance the court applies technical historical doctrines without regard for consequences. In the other, though purporting to apply
those doctrines, the court does so only to the extent that such application does not compel a result unconscionable with the purpose of the
grantor. There are other cases adhering to the. more logical of the two
331 Ill.
437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
'77
S. C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907).
8

Volume I at 82 (1820).
'Supra, note 6 at 329.
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rules, that the conveyance passes the whole interest to the other
grantee.' Still others, like the Deslaurzers case, purport to follow the
Green case, but actually refuse to reach the inevitable though unjust
result required by the application of its principles."
There seem to be no cases in which a conveyance of the property
of one spouse directly to both spouses as joint tenants or as tenants by
the entirety has been held to create such tenancy without the court's
basing its decision, in some part at least, upon a married woman s
statute. Thus, in Boehringer v Schmid,1 2 the court held that such a
conveyance created an estate by the entirety on the ground that title
devolves upon husband and wife as one person at the same time by
virtue of the deed. As the court explained:
"The reason

for intervention of a trustee lay in the common-law

theory that a wife had no legal emstence apart from her husband.
'That theory has been overthrown by statute and the opposite theory
substituted, so that there is no longer any necessity for a trustee. "

This case purports to follow In re Klatzl's Estate,'4 but it can hardly
be said that the Klatzl case actually held that an estate by the entirety
was created by such a conveyance, although it must be admitted that
the New York Court's decision has been the source of considerable
controversy" 5 Three judges were of the opinion that a tenancy by the
entirety was created. In their view the rule that a conveyance to husband and wife necessarily creates a tenancy by the entirety is based
on the doctrine of unity of person created by marriage. They said
that the almost unanimous American judicial opinion indicates the
rule is not abrogated by married women s statutes, for these statutes
only remove disabilities and restraints of the wife incidental to the
unity of person without disrupting the unity created by marriage. In
other words: "If the statute which authorized the conveyance did not
sunder the unity, the conveyance it authorized did not." The husband conveyed, not "to himself, but to a legal unity or entity which
was the consolidation of himself and another."
Three other judges were of the opinion that a tenancy in common
was created. They relied on Saxon v Saxon,'( where the court said:
" Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W 1044 (1924).
' Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W 315 (1915).
1232 N. Y. S. 360 (1928). Accord: In re Vandergrfts Estate, 105 Pa.
Super. Ct. 293, 161 A. 898 (1932); Lang v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 215, 101 A. 706
(1917).
1232 N. Y. S. 360, 362 (1928).
1 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915).
1
In In re Vogelsang, 122 Misc. 599, 203 N.Y. Supp. 364 (1924), both parties
cited In re Klatzl's Estate as sustaining their opposing views as to the effect of such
a conveyance. But the court itself in In re Vogelsang held that a tenancy by the
entirety was created and also that In re Klatzl's Estate so held.
" 46 Misc. 202, 93 N. Y. S. 191 (1905).
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"At the common law a conveyance to husband and wife necessarily
But that
and unavoidably made them tenants by the entirety.
rule cannot apply to a conveyance made under the statute enabling
a husband and wife to convey to each other, for it abrogates the rule
of unity in respect of such conveyance." (Writers Italics)

Each line of reasoning is persuasive, but it appears that the reasoning
in the Saxon case is somewhat illusory It is true that the statute would
seem to abrogate the rule in respect of such conveyances, but it is submitted that it does so only insofar as the ability to convey is concerned,
and not as to the ability to take and to hold as one.' 7 In a few cases one
spouse has conveyed to the other an undivided one-half interest with
a clearly stated intent to create in the husband and wife a tenancy by
the entirety In such a case it would seem clear that the necessary
unities of time and title are lacking and that only a tenancy in common
is created. It has been so held.' 8 But a contrary conclusion was
9
the court saying that "since the decision in
reached in In re Farrand,1
the more recent trend of judicial opinion
the Klatzl case in 1915
appears to be toward holding such a deed to have created a tenancy
by the entirety" Analogy between the Klatzl and Farrandcases is obviously wanting.
There are cases where the problem has been approached from a
different angle. Although admitting that no techmcal joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entirety was created by the owner s conveying to another a one-half undivided interest, since the requisite unities did not
exist, they nevertheless uphold the right of survivorship characteristic

' 1t should be noted that in the Saxon case, although the court said that a
tenancy by the entirety was not created, it held that the husband was able to convey an estate m joint tenancy to his wife and that such an estate was created. But
the court gave no reason for so holding. How it could hold thus without even
mentioning the problem of unities of time and title is rather puzzling. But the
case is very similar to that of Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616
(1929), where husband conveyed to himself and wife "as joint tenants and not
tenants in common." The court said that a tenancy by the entirety could not be
created under the statute permitting conveyances between husband and wife to
the same extent as if they were sole, since an estate by the entirety exists only on the
basic idea that husband and wife are not sole, but one; nor could such tenancy
be created under a statute allowing transfers by a person to himself jointly with
another, since in an estate by the entirety the wife is not another person. But
under the latter statute a joint tenancy was held to have been created. However,
in a later Massachusetts case, Edge v. Barrow, 316 Mass. 104, 55 N.E. 2d 5 (1944),
the court hinted that the Chandler case might be wrong m holding that a tenancy
by the entirety could not be created by a deed from husband to himself and wife.
But if that holding was nght, said the court, the deed in this case runmng from
husband to himself and wife creates a joint tenancy, the land of tenancy with survivorship that it could create.
' In re Walkers Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940); Dressier v. Mulhern,
77 Misc. 476, 136 N. Y. S. 1049 (1912); Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N.W
617 (1911).
" 126 Misc. 590, 214 N. Y. S. 793 (1926).
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of the joint tenancy as annexed to a tenancy in common. 20 Courts applying tlus principle reason that the description in the deed of the
estate as one by the entirety or in joint tenancy clearly manifests an
intention to secure the right of survivorship, and since an estate in
common is created, it is one with right of survivorship annexed to it.
It should be noted that in most of the cases previously considered
"the courts apparently presuppose that the right of survivorship invariably depends upon the existence of a technical common-law estate
by the entireties or joint tenancy, and that the possibility of creating a
right of survivorship not incident to such an estate or tenancy was
not discussed."2 In those jurisdictions where it is conceived that the
right of survivorship is not necessarily dependent on the existence of
a technical joint tenancy, the grantor s intent is given effect only as to
survivorship and not as to the estate created; but since survivorshlp is
the real issue involved, these courts are, for all practical purposes,
carrying out the grantor s intention.
Although the court in Mitchell v Frederick- 2 held that a tenancy in
common with right of survivorship had been created, the court also
said: "The lawful intention of the parties
is to be carried out, and
they are not to be deprived of freedom to convey whatever they wish,
in order to conform to one of the more usual forms and classifications
of ownership." Apparently the Maryland court is not too concerned
with what the estate is called. Indeed, some cases expressly state that
if the intent to create a right of survivorshlp is evident, the intent will
be given effect regardless of the legal nomenclature employed in the
23

instrument.

Notwithstanding the absence of the common-law unities, a few
courts have given effect to the grantor s intention not only as to the
I That a right of survivorsbip, although not incident to an estate in common,
may be annexed thereto if the parties so intend, is a principle laid down in England, Taaffe v. Conmee, 10 H. L. Cas. 64, 11 Eng. Rep. 949 (1862); Doe v. Abey,
1 M. & Sel. 428, 105 Eng. Rep. 160 (1813); 168 Law Times 467 (Dec. 7, 1929);
2 JAmmoN VILLS, 687, 688 (6th Ed. 1893); and followed by several American
cases, Rumons v. Rumons, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S.W 2d 1016 (1948); Hass v. Hass,
248 Wis. 212, 21 N.W 2d 398 (1946); Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 A.
73:3 (1934); In re Brown, 60 F 2d 269 (1932); Burns v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489,
144 A. 848 (1929).
See note, 1 A.L.R. 2d 260 (1948).
=166 Md. 42, 170 A. 733 (1934).
Jones v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 586, 206 S.W 2d 801 (1947); State v. Graleuski, 176 Or. 448, 159 P 2d 211 (1945); Beach v. Holland, 172 Or. 396, 142 P. 2d
990 (1943); Erickson v. Erickson, 167 Or. 1, 115 P. 2d 172 (1941); Johnson v.
Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130,
280 N.W 183 (1938); Dutton v. Bucley, 116 Or. 661, 242 P. 626 (1926);
Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446, 194 N.W 447 (1923); Marble v. Treasurer,
245 Mass. 504, 139 N.E. 442 (1923); New Jersey Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v.
Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, 108 A. 434 (1919).
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creation of a right of survivorship but also as to the creation of a
particular type of estate. This has been true where one has conveyed
24
to himself and another as joint tenants (or as tenants by the entirety)
and also where one has conveyed from himself to another a one-half
undivided interest to be held by him with her "in joint tenancy with
full rights of survivorsnp."25 In these cases the courts have said that
any objection based on the absence of the unities of time and title gives
way to the intention of the parties, which "will overnde, whenever possible, purely formalistic objections to real estate conveyancmg
based on shadowy, subtle, and arbitrary distinctions and niceties of

feudal common law

"26

However, in In re Horlers Estate27 a deed from a wife to her husband stating that the grantor s intention was to convey an undivided
one-half interest to be held by grantee as joint tenant with the grantor
and not as tenant in common "so that the survivor shall have and take
the absolute title in fee simple" was held to create a joint tenancy with
all four unities. As to the objection that unity of title was not created,
the court said:
"But it is unity of title in the joint tenancy with which we are concerned. Therefore, if the wife, as holder of the fee of the entire
property, could by a deed to her husband, without the intervention

of a third party, create in her husband and herself a joint estate,n
there would be unity of title and of time, for the estate would be
"n (Writer s
created at one and the same time by one instrument.
Italics)
The position of the court would be tenable if the wife had conveyed
to herself and her husband, but under the facts the court's effort to
uphold the joint tenancy as including the requisite unities is futile.
Having considered the various approaches to the solution of the
problem as they are reflected in the cases, it is submitted that the
following two principles emerge as those best designed to preserve the
common-law doctrine and at the same time give effect to the grantor s
intention insofar as possible:
(1) A conveyance to grantor and another divests grantor of his title
completely and vests it in himself and Ins wife as one person as
tenants by the entirety or vests it in himself and the other grantee
as joint tenants as the case may be.m
Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W 2d 837 (1946); Edmonds v.
Comm. of Internal Revenue, 90 F 2d 14 (1937); Colson v. Baker, 42 Misc. 407,

87 N. Y. S. 240 (1904).
Therrem v. Therrem, 94 N. II. 66, 46 A. 2d 538 (1946).
A. 2d at 538.
Id. at 168 N. Y. S. 221 (1917).
' She could do this under a married woman s statute.
' Supra note 27 at 223.
' In Kentucky by Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 381.050, in all cases where an estate
by the entirety is intended, the right of survivorship will probably have to be expressly provided for in specific terms.
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(2) A conveyance of an undivided one-half interest' to be held as
joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, as the case may be,
creates a tenancy in common with right of survivorship annexed'
In (1)

it might be objected that the conveyance actually effects

no more than a diminution in the grantor s interest. The answer is
that there is a new and unique title, a new and unique possession, a
new and unique interest passing at one time to form a new and unique
estate.
In none of the situations presented should the grantor s intention
be given effect irrespective of and in complete disregard of commonlaw principles and legal nomenclature. Admittedly, the rationale may
be somewhat fictional, but so are the common-law concepts; and it is
urged that if the grantor s intent can be given effect without serious
or irreconcilable departure from common-law principles, it should be
but not otherwise.23
The Kentucky court in the Haynes case approached the problem in
an unusual way As to one of the fundamental objections in these
cases, viz., that there must be both grantor and grantee, the court
merely said: "Obviously we have both grantor and grantee." The
court did not directly mention the underlying proposition that the
same person cannot be both grantor and grantee. In fact, the court
considered the husband as conveying his undivided one-half interest
to his wife, and the wife as conveying hers to her husband. Obviously
in such a case we do have both grantor and grantee. It is equally
obvious that such grantor-grailtee relationship is not applicable to a
joint tenancy The conveyance by one tenant in common of his undivided one-half interest to the other tenant in common, and a
simultaneous conveyance by the other, could do no more in changing
the nature of the estate than such a conveyance by either tenant in
common to a third person. And yet the Kentucky court in conceiving
the conveyance to be of such nature satisfies itself by drawing a distmction between the principal case and those cases where one spouse
'
Or it could be another interest should the grantor include more than two
in the co-tenancy.
' This principle cannot be applied in (1), for to do so would require a holding
that in those situations one-half undivided interest passed and that a like interest
remained in the grantor in contravention of the principle that those who are
capable grantees shall take the whole, and those who are incapable shall take
nothing.
" It may be argued that antiquated ideas should yield to the unmnstakable
intent of the parties unless logic stands in the way. The answer to this is that
most of our rules and notions concerning real property rest on historical ground
rather than on any other, and to ignore them by judicial decision rather than by
legislative enactments, leads to confusion ultimately more injurious than the isolated
instances of injustice inflicted by adherence to form." 6 B. U. L. Rev. 72, 74
(1926).
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owned the whole and conveyed to himself and the other. The court
simply considered the former case a stronger one for holding that the
four unities do exist. But it seems obvious that it is not a stronger case
if it is conceived as one of simultaneous cross conveyances.
As to the objection that clear intention to create a joint tenancy
with survivorship does not govern the legal operation of the deed, the
court said that "there appears to be a trend away from strict adherence to common law technicalities." And the court went on to say"The modern view appears to be the more sensible and logical: that
is where the intention is clear and unequivocal, permit to be done
directly, that which could be done indirectly. This would make
effectual the interest which the parties by their conveyance intended
to create, without regard to those technicalities descending from the
feudal period."'

This is the real basis for the court's decision and the only one on
which it can stand, since the attempt to reconcile the case with the
common-law principles is futile.
It is reiterated that the court's desire to give effect to the grantor s
intention is commendable, but if a serious contravention of commonlaw rules is thereby entailed, the advantage would be outweighed by
the disadvantages. However, a just result can be attained in the case
without violating doctrines of the common law by applying principle
(1) above: the undivided half interest of each devolves upon both as
joint tenants at one and the same time. This justly disposes of the
problem without severe violence to common-law principles, and at the
same time gives effect to the intention of the grantor.
WUmZM RicE

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. THE "NO RIDERS" PROBLEM
A master is usually held liable for the injuries caused to others by
the tortious conduct of his servants when they are acting within the
scope of their employment.' This doctrine of respondeat superior,
which originated about the beginning of the eighteenth century2 is
one of the few relics remaining from the earliest rule governing tortious
conduct, which imposed on a man absolute liability for all injuries
caused by himself, his family, ins servants or even his inanimate prop' Supra, note 1 at 997.
'PESTATEMENT,
-

AcENcy sec. 219 (1)

TrFFANY, AoFcy 99 (2d ed. 1924).

(1933).

